

Legitimate grievances make suppression on its own, without addressing grievances, insufficient to reduce VEO activity.

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General Description of the Literature:

Political scientists disagree about the role of grievances in a VEO. Many scholars argue that grievances are the basic motivating factor driving an individual's radicalization into a VEO (Newman 2006; Borum 2010). Radicalization that leads to joining a VEO occurs when an individual sees no other way to combat grievances (Meilahn 2008). Furthermore, local grievances are often used as mobilizing factors for violent masses of individuals (Bowman 2009). However, Dershowitz purports that terrorism is not used because of grievances but rather because of its past proven success as a tactic (2002). Kruglanski and Fishman's study suggests there is no relationship between many of the proposed root causes of terrorism and the act of joining a terrorist group (2006). Current studies do not directly address the hypotheses.

Detailed Analyses

135: *Legitimate grievances make suppression on its own, without addressing grievances, insufficient to reduce VEO activity.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence

While there is much literature exploring the effects of grievances and other root causes (addressed in several other hypotheses) on terrorism and VEO activity in general, none of these empirically address the hypothesis by comparing suppression on its own versus suppression with addressing grievances in a context of legitimate grievances.

Empirical Support Score: 0 = No empirical support (for or against the hypothesis)

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: N/A.

Applicability Score: N/A

103: *Addressing "root causes" and extremist rhetoric is more likely to have an effect on non- or less-committed (potential) members of VEOs than hardened members.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: There is no empirical evidence investigating this statement.

Empirical Support Score: 0 = No empirical support (for or against the hypothesis)

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: N/A

Applicability Score: Not Applicable – There is no empirical support in any context.



Bibliography:

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