

Attempts at deterrence lead to increased VEO activity.

17; 179

General Description of the Literature:

Several political science scholars address the role of deterrence in increasing VEO activity. Auerswald notes that deterrence-by-punishment may enhance the VEO's goals of martyrdom and that deterrence-by-denial would only shift attack location rather than completely deterring attacks altogether (2006/7). Arce and Sandler's theory-based argument also suggests deterrence policies shift terrorism to softer targets rather than reducing VEO activity (2005). Deterrence may create grievances in larger groups of the population which could increase the future mobilization of potential VEO members (Lichbach 1987; Lake 2002; Wilkenson 2000). Additionally, deterrence policy that increases economic and political centralization forms a central target for VEOs. The VEO's cost curve and benefit curve both shift up, making it uncertain whether terrorist activity will rise or fall (Frey and Luechinger 2004). More VEO activity may stem from the unintended consequences of deterrence (e.g, increased VEO activity stemming from increased U.S. presence in the Middle East) (Auerswald 2006/7). The literature sufficiently covers many details related to the hypothesis in question. However, due to the breadth of the hypothesis, the statement is difficult to comprehensively address in an empirical study. Related studies, covered in more specific hypotheses, address many of the related details.

Detailed Analyses

17: *Attempts at deterrence lead to increased VEO activity.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Studies in the field of political science only support or go against portions of the hypothesis. Many scholars address the broad theory underlying the hypothesis without producing any empirical evidence.

Empirical Support Score: 0 = No empirical support (for or against the hypothesis)

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: N/A.

Applicability Score: Not Applicable – There is no empirical support in any context

179: *Attempts at deterrence lead to increased VEO activity by signaling salience to the state of attack modalities.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: N/A

Empirical Support Score: 0 = No empirical support (for or against the hypothesis)

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: These studies concern influencing state sponsors of terrorism.

Applicability Score: Not Applicable – There is no empirical support in any context.



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